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ARTICLES
FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY, FEMINIST
LAWMAKING, AND THE LEGAL
PROFESSION
Cynthia Grant Boivman* and Elizabeth Al. Schneider*
INTRODUcTION
T HIS essay addresses the interrelationship among feminist legal
_ theory, feminist lawmaking,' and the legal profession. We de-
scribe a complex interaction between theory and practice that has two
main "arenas": (1) the interaction between feminist legal theory and
the development of feminist lawmaking and substantive law, and (2)
the impact of feminist legal theory upon the way law is practiced. We
begin with a brief introduction to the variety of feminist legal theories
and their relationship to substantive legal struggles in which feminist
practitioners have been engaged. We then turn to a more detailed
description of the impact of feminist legal theory on legal practice and
the legal profession.
We argue that examination of theory and practice in both arenas
reveals a spiral relationship in which feminist practice has generated
feminist legal theory, theory has then reshaped practice, and practice
has in turn reshaped theory.2 Thus, whether the issue is feminist law
reform or the gendered structure of the legal profession, feminist legal
theory cannot be understood apart from practice. At the same time,
the formulation of legal theory has played an integral role in the de-
velopment of social change in all of these areas.
* Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law. Thanks to the Ju-
lius Rosenthal Endowment Fund for research support in the summer of 1998 and to
Daniel Goldwin for his assistance with research for this essay.
** Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. Thanks to the Brooklyn Law School
Faculty Research Program and to Joan Erskine and Alexandra Derian for research
assistance.
1. "Feminist lawmaking" is the process by which "[w]omen have shaped the law
by imagining the law differently[,]... developed theory from practice, turned that new
theory into practice, and then brought it back to theory." Elizabeth M. Schneider,
Feminist Lawmaking and Historical Consciousness: Bringing the Past into tile Future,
2 Va. J. Soc. Pol'y & L. 1, 7 (1994) [hereinafter Schneider, Feminist Lawmaking] (foot-
note omitted); see also Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics:
Perspectives from the Women's Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 589, 604-10 (1986) [here-
inafter Schneider, Dialectic] (detailing the dialectical approach to rights).
2. This relationship has been viewed as dialectical in the lawmaking context. See
Schneider, Dialectic, supra note 1, at 604-05. Others have used the phrase -theory-
practice spiral." See Phyllis Goldfarb, A Theory-Practice Spiral. The Ethics of Femi-
nism and Clinical Education, 75 Minn. L. Rev. 1599, 1617 (1991).
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I. THE INTERRELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY
AND FEMINIST LAWMAKING
During the century preceding the 1960s, there had been substantial
efforts to change the law respecting women's rights in the United
States. The women's suffrage movement fought for inclusion of sex in
the text of the Fourteenth Amendment; Myra Bradwell fought for the
right to be admitted to the bar under the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; many litigants and lawyers
sensitive to issues of sex discrimination raised legal issues concerning
women's equality; and a major and finally successful effort to pass the
Nineteenth Amendment to the Constitution gave women the right to
vote.3 In the 1960s, a "second wave" of an active women's rights
movement developed from the civil rights struggle, leading to re-
newed efforts both to change the law so as to abolish sex discrimina-
tion and to reshape the legal profession so as to integrate women
within it.
4
This effort, led by a new generation of women's rights attorneys,
manifested the interrelationship of theory and practice. Ruth Bader
Ginsburg (then a law professor and counsel to the ACLU Women's
Rights Project), important scholars in the area of sex discrimination
such as Herma Hill Kay at Boalt Hall and Barbara Babcock at Stan-
ford (who taught one of the first Women and the Law courses at Yale
Law School), and many others taught and influenced a younger gener-
ation of students who would become the leading lawyers handling sex-
discrimination litigation. For example, the women's rights litigators
who founded the San Francisco public interest firm Equal Rights Ad-
vocates in 1974 (Wendy Williams, Mary Dunlap, and Nancy Davis)
had worked with Herma Hill Kay at Boalt Hall.5 Ann Freedman and
others who formed the Women's Law Center in Philadelphia had
been students at Yale who worked with Barbara Babcock.6
The National Conference on Women and the Law, an annual meet-
ing of practitioners, law students, and law teachers, also played a criti-
cal role in providing a national forum to discuss and generate cutting-
edge work in the area of women's rights.7 Radical ideas about topics
3. For a brief description of these developments and citations to further reading,
see Mary Becker et al., Feminist Jurisprudence: Taking Women Seriously 1-14 (1994).
4. See id. at 17-30 (citing sources).
5. See Cynthia Fuchs Epstein, Women in Law 137-39 (2d ed. 1993) (describing
the founding of Equal Rights Advocates). For a recent discussion of the evolution of
the work of Equal Rights Advocates, see Judy Scales-Trent, Equal Rights Advocates:
Addressing the Legal Issues of Women of Color, 13 Berkeley Women's L.J. 34, 39-66
(1997).
6. See Barbara Allen Babcock et al., Sex Discrimination and the Law: Causes
and Remedies at v (1975).
7. See id.; Patricia A. Cain, The Future of Feminist Legal Theory, 11 Wis. Wo-
men's L.J. 367, 371-81 (1997) (describing the importance of the conference to the
development of feminist legal theory and her experience as a participant, panelist,
and organizer); Schneider, Feminist Lawmaking, supra note 1, at 1-6.
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such as sexual harassment, date rape, battered women, and self-de-
fense were discussed for the first time in these fora by lawyers who
were working on these issues nationwide. The litigation efforts that
followed, which posed issues of equal protection in a host of areas
such as Social Security,8 pregnancy discrimination, and parental
leave,9 as well as activist efforts around the Equal Rights Amend-
ment,'" raised important arguments about the nature of gender which
laid the foundation for feminist legal theory. Although the presence
of women teachers in the law schools had a huge impact in mobilizing,
energizing, and supporting a younger generation of women entering
the legal profession to do this work, the theories of equality and the
federal Equal Rights Amendment emerged primarily from the practi-
cal demands of activist efforts at lawmaking. For example, in 1971,
Barbara Brown, Ann Freedman, Tom Emerson, and Gail Falk wrote
an important article on Constitutional equality specifically to shape
Congressional efforts to pass the Amendment." Catharine MacKin-
non's 1979 book, Sexual Harassment of Working Women, was written
to present a legal theory that explained the harm of sexual harassment
as it had already been litigated by many feminist lawyers and provide
an effective remedy for these harms.' 2
Today, feminist legal theory has evolved into four major schools:
formal equality theory, "cultural feminism," dominance theory, and
post-modem or anti-essentialist theory.13 Formal equality theory,
grounded in liberal democratic thought, argues that women should be
treated the same as men, while cultural feminists emphasize the need
to take account of "differences" between men and women. Domi-
nance theory sidesteps both of these approaches, focusing instead
upon the embedded structures of power that make men's characteris-
tics the norm from which "difference" is constructed. Anti-essential-
ism, by contrast, contends that there is no single category "female,"
pointing instead to the varying perspectives resulting, for example,
from the intersection of gender, race and class. The last three ap-
8. See, eg., Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977) (construing section 215 of
the Social Security Act); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977) (construing the
Federal Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance program); Weinberger v. Vie-
senfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (same).
9. See California Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987) (con-
struing the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484
(1974) (construing section 2626 of the California Unemployment Insurance Code).
10. Becker et al., supra note 3, at 22-24; Jane J. Mansbridge, Why We Lost the
ERA (1986).
11. Barbara A. Brown et al., The Equal Rights Amendment. A Constitutional Ba-
sis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 Yale L.J. 871 (1971) (outlining the development,
structure, and anticipated operation of the proposed Equal Rights Amendment).
12. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Sexual Harassment of Working Women: A Case of
Sex Discrimination (1979).
13. For discussion of each of these four branches of feminist legal theory, see
Becker et al., supra note 3, at 68-98, 110-35.
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proaches are all "theoretical" critiques of formal equality which
emerged from the contradictions and political struggles that devel-
oped in the course of efforts to implement formal equality in practice
and addressed the limits of formal equality in redressing sex
discrimination.
The emergence of cultural feminism or "difference" perspectives in
the law were largely shaped by efforts to understand the uniquely fe-
male experiences of pregnancy and motherhood. For example, the
historical failure of the Supreme Court's equality jurisprudence to ad-
dress issues of pregnancy as implicating issues of gender equality 4
had an enormous impact on women's lives and the law. In response,
the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 defined pregnancy discrimi-
nation as sex discrimination under Title VII 15 and generated renewed
attention to the notion of "difference" in a variety of contexts.
In contrast, dominance theory presented an important theoretical
framework within which to understand the harms of violence against
women in areas such as domestic violence, rape, sexual harassment,
and pornography. Formal equality (or at least a "gender complemen-
tarity" theory of formal equality) was not adequate to analyze these
harms, experienced almost exclusively by women, because it failed to
address the patriarchal structures of power that led to and perpetu-
ated them. Thus, dominance theory emerged from efforts to grapple
with the reality and experience of male dominance and privilege in
these areas.
Finally, anti-essentialist or post-modern feminism developed from
challenges to a notion of a single feminist legal theory and perspective
and articulated the need to account for the wide range of feminist
perspectives that emerged from women of color, issues of ethnicity,
problems of immigrant women, and cultural differences. 16 For exam-
ple, Kimberl6 Crenshaw criticizes feminist legal theory's failure to re-
flect African American women's experience of rape, 7 while Paulette
14. See Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 497 n.20 (stating that discrimination based upon
pregnancy is not sex discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause, because it
classifies between non-pregnant persons, who can be male or female, and pregnant
persons).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1994).
16. See, e.g., Kimberl6 Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and
Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and
Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. Chi. Legal F. 139, 140 [hereinafter Crenshaw, Demarginal-
izing the Intersection] (arguing that many of the experiences that black women face
are not subsumed within the traditional boundaries of race or gender discrimination);
Kimberl6 Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Identity Politics, Intersectionality and Vio-
lence Against Women of Color, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 1241, 1242-44 (1991) (describing the
intersectional location of women of color and their marginalization within dominant
resistance discourses); Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal The-
ory, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 581, 585 (1990) (discussing the need for multiple consciousness in
the feminist movement).
17. See Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection, supra note 16, at 157-60.
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Caldwell explains how employment discrimination law fails to capture
discrimination that is motivated by both sex and race. 8 This approach
has emphasized the importance of storytelling, both as a way to bring
diverse experiences into the law and as a way to broaden the legal
descriptions of experience that are translated into law. 9 This theoret-
ical perspective challenges us to address the intersections of race, gen-
der, ethnicity, class, sexual orientation, age, and disability, as well as to
explore what commonality might mean in coalition efforts. It also
challenges us to move beyond the telling of stories to more substan-
tive change.
There are many examples of how the spiral from practice to theory
and back to practice has operated. For example, feminist practice ef-
forts to argue pregnancy as an issue of gender equality led to both
practical law reform strategies such as the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act and feminist legal scholarship on these issues. A variety of per-
spectives were developed by Sylvia Law,20 Herma Hill Kay,2' Wendy
Williams,2 and Lucinda Finley,' among others, and were reflected in
public disagreement and debate in the "Cal Fed" case, in which femi-
nist groups filed opposing briefs about whether pregnancy disability
should be given "special" treatment not afforded to other temporary
disabilities.24
18. See Paulette M. Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection of
Race and Gender, 1991 Duke L.J. 365, 371-72.
19. See, eg., Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea
for Narrative, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 2411, 2412-13 (1989) (describing how outsiders' stories
build cohesion within the excluded group and subvert the dominant ideology); Kim
Lane Scheppele, Foreword: Telling Stories, 87 Mich. L Rev. 2073, 2083-84 (1989)
(describing the broadening of legal discourse to include the stories of "outsiders" such
as women and people of color).
20. See Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. Pa. L Rev. 955,
1008-10 (1984) (arguing for heightened scrutiny of laws governing reproductive biol-
ogy, including an inquiry into whether the law has a significant impact in perpetuating
the oppression of women).
21. See Herna Hill Kay, Equality and Difference: Tile Case of Pregnancy, 1
Berkeley Women's LJ. 1, 37-38 (1985) (arguing that the proper comparison to deter-
mine sex discrimination is between employees who exercise their reproductive rights
and become pregnant-a group comprised entirely of women-and male employees,
who exercise their reproductive rights but do not become pregnant).
22. See Wendy W. Williams, Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal Treat-
ment/Special Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 325, 330 (1984-
1985) (arguing that the burden of justification should be placed upon the party de-
fending a law or rule that has a disproportionate negative impact on one sex).
23. See Lucinda M. Finley, Transcending Equality Theory: A Way Out of the Ma-
ternity and the Workplace Debate, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 1118, 1165-67 (1986) (arguing for
an integration of the public sphere of work and the private sphere of family, and a re-
ordering of the gender hierarchy that currently values the "masculine" public sphere
at the expense of the "feminine" private sphere).
24. In California Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n %. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987),
feminist legal scholars filed amicus briefs on both sides. NOW, the NOW Legal De-
fense and Education Fund, the National Women's Law Center and others, repre-
sented by Wendy Williams, argued that the California statute requiring employers to
provide leave for childbirth constituted sex discrimination and should be upheld only
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In short, feminist legal theory has highlighted the issue of gender in
law, and the range of feminist legal theories that have developed con-
tinue to deepen our understanding of the complex interrelationship
between gender and law. But it is important to appreciate the critical
way in which feminist legal theory emerged from practice, and the
way in which new theoretical insights formulated by litigators and aca-
demics continue to reshape practice. Indeed, feminist legal theory,
understood generically, has been the intellectual means for argument
and debate about issues of equality that first emerged in law reform
practice and continue to resonate both in practice and in the world at
large.
This interrelationship is inevitable because the worlds of theory and
practice in this area of the law are inextricably linked. An unusual
number of feminist legal theorists and academics have a background
in practice, particularly on issues of gender.' Many continue to work
as scholar-activists and cultural commentators on a range of issues af-
fecting gender and law-as lawyers arguing cases, drafting legislation,
writing amicus briefs, serving as reporters to state and federal task
forces, or commenting to the media-or have moved among these
roles at different periods of their professional lives.2 6
Theory and practice are also inextricably linked in this area because
of the close proximity between issues of life and law. Anita Hill's
challenge to Clarence Thomas's Supreme Court appointment, for ex-
ample, highlighted more than a decade of litigation and scholarship on
sexual harassment and resulted, in turn, in the further refinement of
feminist theory. 7 The O.J. Simpson case brought similar work on do-
if employers were required to provide disability leave to all employees. Other femi-
nist law professors and other groups, represented by Christine Littleton and Judith
Resnik, filed a brief arguing that the law should be upheld because it remedied a form
of sex discrimination not addressed by federal law, the discriminatory impact of inad-
equate leave policies on women's right of procreative choice. The Supreme Court
upheld the California legislation, holding that it had not been preempted by the Preg-
nancy Discrimination Act. For excerpts from the two amicus briefs, see Becker et al.,
supra note 3, at 65-67.
25. Wendy Williams, Catharine MacKinnon, Carrie Menkel-Meadow, and Lucie
White are only some of the many feminist legal scholars whose work is grounded in
feminist legal practice experience.
26. For example, law professors such as Rhonda Copelon, Sylvia Law, Christine
Littleton, Judith Resnik, Deborah Rhode, Susan Deller Ross, Nadine Taub, Wendy
Williams, and both authors of this article are among many who have participated in
these different ways.
27. The Southern California Law Review, for example, held a symposium on the
Hill-Thomas hearings, which produced, among other wonderful pieces of scholarship,
Martha R. Mahoney's article, Exit: Power and the Idea of Leaving in Love, Work, and
the Confirmation Hearings, 65 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1283 (1992). In it, Mahoney attacks the
idea that if a woman does not leave a job or battering relationship then the harass-
ment or violence against her either did not exist or could not have been "so bad,"
arguing that this idea fails to recognize that women more typically attempt to stop the
attacks and preserve what is rewarding about the job or relationship (as well as to
avoid the even greater problems that leaving can pose). See id. at 1300-04.
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mestic violence and intimate femicide to public attention and, in turn,
generated feminist analysis.' Current debates concerning President
Clinton, Paula Jones, and Monica Lewinsky again bring issues of femi-
nist "theory" to the fore. In short, feminist practice and theory con-
cern issues of daily life-how women and men live, work, and relate.
These real-life issues engage and galvanize public attention and then
generate law reform efforts, such as the effort to educate Congress
about sexual harassment in the Clarence Thomas confirmation hear-
ings, which in turn generate more theory. And the spiral continues,
as, for example, the tremendous amount of sexual harassment litiga-
tion that arose after the Hill-Thomas hearings led to the Supreme
Court's series of decisions in 199829 and resulted in richer and more
nuanced theoretical exploration among feminist legal scholars.Y
IL THE INTERRELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY
AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION
Just as substantive legal doctrines, law reform, and social change
have developed out of the interplay between theory and practice, fem-
inist legal theory has also emerged from women's experience in the
legal profession and has contributed, in turn, to shaping that experi-
ence. The admission of women into law schools in the late 1960s led
to the proliferation of both feminist lawmaking and feminist legal the-
ory. At the same time, women graduating from those institutions in
28. See, e.g., Donna Meredith Matthews, Making the Crucial Connection: A Pro-
posed Threat Hearsay Exception, 27 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. 117, 159-64 (1997) (argu-
ing for a domestic homicide victim exception to hearsay evidence rules to allow the
court to hear about the victims' fears of lethal attack); Myrna S. Raeder, The Admissi-
bility of Prior Acts of Domestic Violence: Simpson and Beyond, 69 S. Cal. L Rev.
1463, 1512-16 (1996) (arguing that the rules of evidence that bar evidence of previous
acts of domestic violence in femicide trials are gender-biased and must be changed to
allow a jury to see the pattern of violence between a defendant and his victim in order
to render a fair verdict); Karleen F. Murphy, Note, A Hearsay Erception for Physical
Abuse, 27 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. 497, 522-25 (1997) (evaluating the physical abuse
exception to existing hearsay rules enacted by the California legislature in response to
the verdict in the criminal trial of O.J. Simpson).
29. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 2279 (1998); Burlington
Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 2269 (1998); Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch.
Dist., 118 S. Ct. 1989,2000 (1998); Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv. Inc., 118 S. Ct.
998, 1001 (1998).
30. See generally, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, The New Jurisprudence of Sexual Harass-
ment, 83 Cornell L. Rev. 1169 (1998) (arguing that sexual harassment should be un-
derstood as a practice that preserves male control and entrenches masculine norms in
the workplace-an interference with human agency, particularly the agency of wo-
men); Anita Bernstein, Treating Sexual Harassment with Respect, 111 Harv. L Rev.
445 (1997) (urging that the "reasonableness" standards for sexual harassment law
should be replaced with an alternate standard of the "respectful" person); Katherine
M. Franke, Gender, Sex, Agency and Discrimination: A Reply to Professor Abrams,
83 Cornell L. Rev. 1245 (1998) (defending the author's formulation of sexual harass-
ment as gender-based harm); Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment,
107 Yale L. 1683 (1998) (proposing a competence-centered account of hostile work
environment harassment).
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increasing numbers during the 1970s and 1980s had a direct interest in
the structure of the legal profession and its responsiveness to their
needs as lawyers as well as litigants. As a result, feminist legal theo-
rists have taken a lively interest in the issues raised by the problems
women encounter in the legal profession, and the development of var-
ious feminist theoretical perspectives has dramatically impacted law
reform efforts within the profession itself. In addition, women practi-
tioners, judges, and academics became involved in investigating and
reporting on the status of women in the legal profession for a variety
of groups, including the ABA Commission on Women in the Profes-
sion and both state and federal gender bias task forces. The reports
that resulted from their investigations reflected a persistent sexism
that has plagued women's entry into the legal profession, exposing the
limits of formal equality in this context.
The mass of material that now exists on gender bias within the legal
profession, on balancing career and family, and on sexism within the
traditional law firm culture attests to the continuing vitality (and per-
haps depressing consistency) of these themes. Reflecting upon efforts
to address the problem of gender bias within the profession, feminist
legal scholars and practitioners have developed profound insights into
the nature of, and institutional obstacles to, gender equality. They
have also begun to develop both innovative lawyering practices and
theories about the legal profession, the status of women within it, and
sources of change. Like the development of substantive legal doc-
trines, theory in this context cannot be divorced from practice and
from the real-life experiences of women.
A. Formal Equality as the Route into the Legal Profession
To paraphrase Catharine MacKinnon, women lawyers cannot help
but have a certain affection for formal equality theory, because it was
responsible for gaining them access to the legal profession on the
same terms as men.31 With some exceptions, women were largely ex-
cluded from legal education for much of the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries. Harvard Law School admitted its first women students only
in 1950, and a few other schools excluded women until the 1960s and
1970s.32 Even then, women law students faced other barriers, as ad-
missions quotas restricted their numbers and hostility greeted their
presence in the classroom.33 Federal anti-discrimination laws,
31. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Difference and Dominance: On Sex Discrimina-
tion, in Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law 32, 35 (1987) ("I have to
confess a sincere affection for [formal equality theory] .... It has gotten women some
access to employment and education, the public pursuits, including academic, profes-
sional, and blue-collar work .... " (citations omitted)).
32. See Cynthia Fuchs Epstein, Women in Law 50 (1981).
33. See id. at 63-67; Karen Berger Morello, The Invisible Bar: The Woman Law-
yer in America: 1638 to the Present 103-07 (1986).
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grounded in notions of formal equality, were responsible for shatter-
ing outright barriers to access to legal education.34 In March 1971, the
Professional Women's Caucus filed a class action lawsuit against every
law school in the country receiving federal funds, based in part on
preliminary statistics provided by the Association of American Law
Schools' Committee on Women in Legal Education." Thereafter, the
number of women studying law increased from 8.5% of the total in
1970 to 33.5% in 1980,36 and has hovered between 40% and 50% since
1986.37
Upon graduation from law school, women still faced barriers to ob-
taining legal jobs, especially in elite law firms; until the 1970s, Wall
Street firms openly refused to hire women.3" Again, lawsuits based on
formal equality principles provided a remedy for the outright refusal
to hire women, and Title VII suits were ultimately successful in forc-
ing law firms to hire women.39 Thus, it is not surprising that formal
equality theories were the first to attract allegiance among legal prac-
titioners and academics, as they had been so necessary and were so
rapidly successful in breaking down formal barriers to women's entry
into the legal profession.
B. Early Theoretical Reflections upon the Continuing Problems that
Formal Equality Does Not Address
Once women were admitted to law schools and law firms, they en-
countered problems that formal equality theory did not appear to ad-
dress. Informal barriers to success in law firms proved even harder to
surmount than outright denial of access had been. Hired as associates
in numbers comparable to men, few women became partners or rose
to positions of power within private firms, supporting the notion that
some sort of "glass ceiling" prevented the promotion of women to
positions at the top of the law firm hierarchy.4" Women's continuing
role as the primary caretakers of children (and of elderly persons and
households in general) appeared to be incompatible with the structure
of high-powered legal work, with its requirements for very long hours
worked away from home.
34. See Becker et al., supra note 3, at 825-26; Herma Hill Kay & Martha S. West,
Sex-Based Discrimination: Text, Cases and Materials 1121-23 (4th ed. 1996).
35. See Judith Hole & Ellen Levine, Rebirth of Feminism 103 (1971).
36. See Epstein, supra note 32, at 53.
37. See Commission on Women in the Profession, American Bar Ass'n, Unfin-
ished Business: Overcoming the Sisyphus Factor 7 (1995) [hereinafter ABA 1995
Report].
38. See Epstein, supra note 32, at 83-95; Morello, supra note 33, at 194-217.
39. See Epstein, supra note 32, at 184-88; Morello, supra note 33, at 210-15.
40. See Commission on Women in the Profession, American Bar Ass'n, Report to
the House of Delegates 5 (1988) [hereinafter ABA 1988 Report]; Mona Harrington,
Women Lawyers: Rewriting the Rules 37-38 (1994).
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Women entering legal academia faced similar problems. By 1986,
women represented 40% of law students but only about 20% of full-
time law faculty, and many women law teachers were employed as
clinicians or legal writing instructors-lower-paying and lower-status
positions within the law school hierarchy.4' Studies also showed that
women law professors obtained tenure at a lower rate than men.42
Women of color still fare worst in the law teaching market. They
enter teaching at lower ranks than minority men of similar qualifica-
tions, obtain jobs at significantly less prestigious schools, and are more
likely to teach courses considered low in status-differences that per-
sist when controlling for a variety of indicia of merit, such as academic
credentials and clerkships.43
Whether as a result of their own failure to thrive in academia, their
own previous experiences in practice, or reports returning from fe-
male students they had taught, feminist law professors began to reflect
upon the reasons that women continued to face barriers to full partici-
pation in the legal profession. The theories they advanced in this con-
text began to develop a sustained critique of formal equality as the
route to improving women's status within the profession.
One of the earliest and most influential articles was written by Car-
rie Menkel-Meadow. In Portia in a Different Voice,4 4 Menkel-
Meadow applied Carol Gilligan's "different voice" (or cultural femi-
nist) theory to women's participation in the legal profession. Begin-
ning from Gilligan's conclusion that women tend to employ different
modes of moral reasoning than men, and specifically an "ethic of
care" rather than a more abstract rights-based approach, Menkel-
Meadow suggested that women would also prefer a substantially dif-
ferent lawyering style than men. This would explain women's discom-
fort at the adversarial, win/lose rules of engagement in both law
school and litigation. Menkel-Meadow thus suggested that women
lawyers would reject adversarial modes of practice and seek modes of
lawyering that take the interests of all parties into account and en-
deavor to preserve the relationships among them-alternative dispute
resolution, for example.45 She argued that women lawyers would also
organize their work relationships in a less competitive, more collabo-
41. See Marina Angel, Women in Legal Education: What It's Like to Be Part of a
Perpetual First Wave or the Case of the Disappearing Women, 61 Temp. L. Rev. 799,
803 (1988).
42. See Richard H. Chused, The Hiring and Retention of Minorities and Women on
American Law School Faculties, 137 U. Pa. L. Rev. 537, 550 (1988).
43. See Deborah J. Merritt et al., Family, Place, and Career: The Gender Paradox
in Law School Hiring, 1993 Wis. L. Rev. 395, 405-06.
44. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice: Speculations on a Wo-
men's Lawyering Process, 1 Berkeley Women's L.J. 39 (1985) [hereinafter Menkel-
Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice]; see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia Redux: An-
other Look at Gender, Feminism, and Legal Ethics, 2 Va. J. Soc. Pol'y & L. 75 (1994).
45. See Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice, supra note 44, at 50-55.
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rative, and egalitarian manner and would structure the workplace to
accommodate the demands of private as well as public life.4 6
Menkel-Meadow's early cultural feminist analysis of the legal pro-
fession, while speculative, was suggestive of further research. For ex-
ample, Rand Jack and Dana Crowley Jack used this approach in their
empirical study of thirty-six lawyers, concluding that gender was asso-
ciated with different moral orientations and responses to ethical di-
lemmas, but only when the legal norm or professional standard was
unclear.4 7 If so, this does little to alleviate the discomfort women law-
yers who are care-oriented may feel in an adversarial legal setting.
Based upon their interviews with individual women lawyers, the Jacks
described three different ways they handled this conflict: (1) some
simply emulated the "male" rights-oriented model and denied their
more "relational" selves, subordinating personal concerns to the de-
mands of their professional roles; (2) others "split the self" into a de-
tached lawyer at work and the caring self at home; and (3) still others
attempted to reshape their role as lawyers to conform to their per-
sonal morality.48
Suzanna Sherry applied a cultural feminist approach to the judici-
ary, attempting to demonstrate through her study of the opinions of
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor that women judges display greater con-
cern for context and community and less for abstract rules than do
male judges.49 Her conclusions have been called into question by
later studies50 and challenged by Justice O'Connor herself.5' De-
tached from an attempt to identify specific theoretical or moral ap-
proaches with particular individuals, the cultural relativist approach to
judging as a legal enterprise may provide important insights. In a re-
cent book, for example, Robin West describes an ethic of care rooted
in a preeminently female experience of connection, emotion, related-
ness, and empathy, which, she argues, provides a distinct moral stance
that is interdependent with and necessary to an ethic of justice.52 An-
alyzing judicial opinions in a number of recent cases, West shows that
46. See id. at 56-57.
47. See Rand Jack & Dana Crowley Jack, Moral Vision and Professional Deci-
sions: The Changing Values of Women and Men Lawyers 54-55, 75 (1989).
48. See i. at 130-55.
49. See Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Ad-
judication, 72 Va. L. Rev. 543, 592-613 (1986).
50. See, e.g., Sue Davis, The Voice of Sandra Day O'Connor, 77 Judicature 134,
138-39 (1993) (concluding that Justice O'Connor's record "do[es] very little to support
the assertion that [her] decision making is distinct by virtue of her gender"). A recent
article compared the decisions of Justices O'Connor and Ginsburg and concluded that
the differences, driven primarily by ideology, between them were more significant
than the similarities. See Michael E. Solimine & Susan E. Wheatley, Rethinking Femi-
nist Judging, 70 Ind. LJ. 891, 900-05 (1995).
51. See Sandra Day O'Connor, Portia's Progress, 66 N.Y.U. L Rev. 1546, 1558
(1991).
52. See Robin West, Caring for Justice 22-93 (1997).
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a judge who fails on either branch-justice or care-fails to render a
genuinely just decision.53 Thus, the insights of cultural relativism,
drawn from the experiences of women's lives, are "fed back" into the
real world of legal practice as more universal guides for judging.
Other feminist legal scholars have grounded themselves in domi-
nance feminism for their analysis of women's continuing problems in
the legal profession. In her attack upon formal equality, Catharine
MacKinnon had challenged the origins and structural significance of
the "norms" that define "normality" in the workplace, showing that
men and their typical lives were taken as the standard against which
the performance of all persons were to be measured. 4 Following this
approach, other feminist legal scholars have openly attacked the rules
under which success in the legal arena is defined and which serve to
perpetuate men's dominance in the profession. In an important early
essay, Leslie Bender pursued this analysis in the context of women's
efforts at success in law firms as they are currently structured.5 She
attacked both formal equality's assimilationist premise that women
should be required to take on the characteristics and lifestyles cur-
rently associated with men in order to succeed as lawyers and the cul-
tural feminist argument that women should be accorded "special"
treatment, like the "mommy-track, ' 56 to compensate for their differ-
ences from men. Instead, Bender argued that the legal profession was
"constructed by men to reinforce and reward their gendered male
characteristics," and must be reconstructed on the basis of gender
equality, eliminating the disadvantages women face in their continuing
roles as interpersonal caregivers.5 1 In short, feminist theoretical anal-
ysis of the legal profession resulted in calls to end discrimination
against women lawyers by changing in profound ways how law is
practiced.
C. Attempts by Women Lawyers and Academics to Attack the
Problem of Gender Bias in the Profession: Task Forces
and Commissions
In the 1980s and 1990s, a new form of literature began to emerge-
reports from task forces and commissions established by women prac-
titioners under the aegis of state supreme courts or bar associations.5 8
53. See id. at 50-61.
54. See MacKinnon, supra note 31, at 34, 36, 43 (1987).
55. Leslie Bender, Sex Discrimination or Gender Inequality?, 57 Fordham L. Rev.
941 (1989).
56. The term "mommy-track" is typically used to describe more flexible, often
part-time, working arrangements established for women with small children. See id. at
943.
57. Id. at 949.
58. The first reports were published in the early 1980s by task forces established
by the New Jersey and New York supreme courts, at the instigation of women judges
and practitioners. See The First Year Report of the New Jersey Supreme Court Task
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The gender bias task force movement provides the most striking ex-
ample of this development, which compiled and described the exper-
iences of women in the legal system both as lawyers and litigants. The
material assembled by the task forces provided data about the
problems women lawyers continued to experience in the profession,
and some included suggestions for change. In addition, publication of
the reports was official recognition that discrimination against women
in the legal profession continued to exist and thus legitimized the
claims that had been emerging from the academy.
The task forces undertaking these independent investigations typi-
cally consisted of a mix of judges, practitioners, and academics; their
methods of research included surveys, public hearings, and round-ta-
bles. Among other topics, each task force undertook an investigation
of gender bias in the courtroom. The ABA Commission on Women in
the Profession extended the investigation to discrimination against
women in law firms and other settings, held public hearings, and pub-
lished reports in 1988 and 1995.59 Women law professors took part in
all of these commissions and task forces, often assisting in research
design and drafting the reports.60
The findings presented in these reports are astonishingly similar,
lending persuasion from their sheer cumulative effect. The state court
task force reports describe continuing discrimination against women
Force on Women in the Courts-June 1984,9 Women's Rts. L Rep. 129 (1986); Report
of the New York Task Force on Women in the Courts (1986), 15 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1
(1986-1987). By now, a total of 35 states and five federal judicial circuits have issued
reports as well. See Gender Bias Topic Bibliography (1998) (Info. Serv., Nat'l Ctr. for
State Courts, P.O. Box 8798, Williamsburg, VA 23187-8798).
59. ABA 1988 Report, supra note 40; ABA 1995 Report, supra note 37. The ABA
Commission also published a report on women in legal education in 1996. See Com-
mission on Women in the Profession, American Bar Ass'n, Elusive Equality: The
Experiences of Women in Legal Education (1996). These are only a few of the re-
ports issued by groups of women practitioners in the last decade. See Cynthia Fuchs
Epstein et al., Report, Glass Ceilings and Open Doors: Women's Advancement in the
Legal Profession, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 291 (1995); Section of Business Law, American
Bar Ass'n, Where Have All the Women Gone? The Retention and Promotion of
Female Lawyers (1996). Women law students and law placement personnel under-
took somewhat similar studies. See, e.g., Harvard Women's Law Ass'n, Presumed
Equal: What America's Top Women Lawyers Really Think About their Firms (1995);
Marilyn Tucker et al., Whatever Happened to the Class of 1983?, 78 Geo. LJ. 153
(1989).
60. For example, Cynthia Grant Bowman served as Reporter for the Illinois Task
Force, Karen Czapanskiy for the Maryland Committee on Gender Bias, and Suellyn
Scamecchia for the Michigan Task Force; and Judith Resnik participated in the Gen-
der Bias Task Force for the Ninth Circuit. Law professors also contributed a number
of longitudinal studies of their graduates to the literature. See, e.g., David L Cham-
bers, Accommodation and Satisfaction: Women and Men Lawyers and the Balance of
Work and Family, 14 L. & Soc. Inquiry 251 (1989) (studying University of Michigan
Law School graduates' gender differences in balancing work and family); Lee E. Tei-
telbaum et al., Gender, Legal Education, amid Legal Careers, 41 J. Legal Educ. 443
(1991) (reporting on the career choices of male and female University of New Mexico
Law School graduates).
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lawyers in the courtroom by male attorneys and judges-for example,
inappropriate and derogatory treatment, assumptions that women are
less credible than men, and a variety of forms of sexual harassment.
In addition, the findings demonstrate how women's and men's percep-
tions of discrimination differ (in effect, women see it and men don't
notice) .61 Although the task force reports were largely essentialist
with regard to their conclusions about the experiences of women,
some included brief references to the effect, for example, that the ex-
periences of African American women were even worse.62 Most of
the state task forces deliberately chose to set aside questions of race
or other discrimination in the legal profession for separate study, leav-
ing the experiences of women of color (or of other marginalized
groups) to fall between the cracks.63
Bar association studies pointed repeatedly to job segregation, pay
differentials, glass ceilings, sexual harassment, and overwhelming
work/family conflicts encountered by women lawyers.' The 1988
ABA Report described testimony by women in law firms to the effect
that they lacked mentors, were excluded from socialization with cli-
ents, were not assigned to "plum" cases or only given minor roles on
them, and were required to overcome a presumption of incompe-
tence.65 Moreover, the Glass Ceiling Report published by the New
York City Bar Association in 1995 indicated that things might be get-
ting worse rather than better: whereas 15.25% of female hires became
partners between 1973 and 1981, only 5% of post-1981 hires did.66
Some have argued that the work of the various task forces and com-
missions constituted an exercise in feminist theory-essentially, cul-
tural feminism-in that they listened to women's voices and focused
61. For descriptions of the reports of the state task forces, see Ann J. Gellis, Great
Expectations: Women in the Legal Profession, A Commentary on State Studies, 66 Ind.
L.J. 941 (1991); Judith Resnik, Asking about Gender in Courts, 21 Signs: J. of Women
in Culture and Soc'y 952 (1996); Jeannette F. Swent, Gender Bias at the Heart of
Justice: An Empirical Study of State Task Forces, 6 S. Cal. Rev. L. & Women's Stud. 1
(1996).
62. See, e.g., Illinois Task Force on Gender Bias in the Courts, The 1990 Report of
the Illinois Task Force on Gender Bias in the Courts 221 (1990) (reporting instances
of patronizing, demeaning, and dismissive conduct by male judges toward African-
American female attorneys). California, Michigan, and Florida, as well as the federal
task forces for the Ninth and D.C. Circuits, have made the experiences of women of
color a more direct subject of study. See Resnik, supra note 61, at 974.
63. See id. at 973-77. Indeed, a number of manuals for both gender bias as well as
race and ethnic bias task forces counseled separate treatment, for fear of distracting
attention paid from one to the other. See id. at 975.
64. See, e.g., Gellis, supra note 61, at 944-59 (recounting dissimilarities between
men and women lawyers with respect to financial rewards, opportunities for advance-
ment, firm dynamics, discrimination, and gender issues).
65. See ABA 1988 Report, supra note 40, at 11-12; see also ABA 1995 Report,
supra note 37, at 10.
66. See Epstein et al., supra note 59, at 358-59.
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upon women's experiences as different from men's. 7 The theoretical
grounding of the various studies carried out by the bench and the bar,
however, was formal equality; this was perhaps inevitable, given the
composition of the groups that authored them, which included power-
ful "insiders."6 Thus, discrimination against women was regarded
primarily as an aberration perpetrated against individuals, the contin-
uation of outdated stereotypes, and an irrationality rather than a
structural problem requiring radical change in the profession.69 As a
result of this theoretical grounding, recommendations for change
tended to be incremental, partial, and aimed at a particular manifesta-
tion of the problem. As a remedy for in-court discrimination, for ex-
ample, task forces recommended judicial education and better control
by judges of their courtrooms. 70 To remedy problems faced by women
in law firms, recommendations included part-time work and flexible
schedules.7 ' A good deal of self-help literature appeared as well, con-
taining, for example, advice about "rainmaking" by women.'
At the same time, however, practitioners for whom these incremen-
tal changes had not worked told their stories in the legal press. Law-
yers who had worked part-time or flexible hours, for instance,
described how "part-time" was interpreted as forty hours a week and
resulted in guilt on their own part and resentment by others, loss of
benefits and desirable work assignments, and either delay or complete
derailment from the partnership track.73 In short, if the theory behind
the task force recommendations was formal equality, the real-life ex-
perience of women lawyers was proving its limits.
D. Academic Theory Confronts the Data from Practice
The studies and anecdotal evidence accumulated by practitioners
did accomplish a number of things that were essential to the further
development of feminist theorizing about the legal profession. Similar
to the consciousness-raising groups of the 1960s, the reports of multi-
ple task forces and commissions allowed women lawyers to begin to
67. See Resnik, supra note 61, at 962 (describing unpublished presentation by Ann
Shalleck).
68. Id. at 958-59.
69. As Judith Resnik observes, the "task forces themselves demonstrate the suc-
cess of liberal theory in constructing an ideology of fairness that the documentation of
systemic unfairness itself does not undo." Id. at 978-79.
70. See Swent, supra note 61, at 70-75.
71. See, e.g., ABA 1988 Report, supra note 40, at 15-16 (noting that a balance
between family and work enhances productivity); ABA 1995 Report, supra note 37, at
17-19, 25, 27 (discussing various policies law firms have implemented to enhance wo-
men's position in the workplace).
72. See, eg., Anne S. Gallagher, Widening The Net, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1995, at 60, 60
(discussing, for example, the rise in women's networking groups as a means of im-
proving business skills); Stephanie F. Cahill, The Rain Women, Cal. L Bus., Oct. 7,
1996, at 16 (advising women on improving business savvy).
73. See Susan Vogel, Tire Perils of Part Thune, Cal. Law., Apr. 1996, at 37, 37-38.
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see their own experiences and perceived failures not as personal or
private issues to be worked out on an individual basis (which was
clearly not working) or as personal failures (or anomalies, as law firms
typically explain the attrition of previous women lawyers to newly re-
cruited female associates). Moreover, the sheer weight of the evi-
dence impressed the task force and commission members and forced
them to begin to reformulate the problems confronted as not just "wo-
men's issues," but instead as issues for men, the profession, and soci-
ety as a whole.
Additionally, the task force and commission reports and other em-
pirical studies supplied important data to scholars, which both allowed
and invited the application of a more theoretical approach. Feminist
scholars within the legal academy were quick to make use of this data,
either to test out or to formulate their own theories about sex discrim-
ination. A large literature developed, from which just a few examples
will be presented here, in order to show how theoretical examination
from a feminist perspective contributes to analysis and reform of the
legal profession.
Elizabeth Chambliss brings the social science literature of large-
scale organizations to bear upon the problems of integrating women
into the structure of the large law firm.74 She examines the impact of
a variety of organizational factors, such as size, bureaucratization, pro-
motion structure, and practice characteristics upon the integration of
women in ninety-seven elite firms.75 A fact of central importance, she
notes, is the highly subjective nature of evaluations toward partner-
ship, by which law firms in essence "construct" their own labor supply
by determining what sorts of characteristics to reward at both the as-
sociate and partner level.76 Chambliss concludes that the factors hav-
ing the most significant effect upon the integration of women are the
length of time to partnership and the degree of bureaucratization of
the firm, which she surmises may formalize previously informal pat-
terns of occupational segregation.77
These are interesting observations, based upon hard empirical data
that confirm the problems women have had succeeding in the struc-
ture of large law firms. But what follows from this analysis? Should
all law firms adopt longer partnership tracks? How is this to happen?
Who or what will bring about the desired changes? Individual law
74. See Elizabeth Chambliss, Organizational Determinants of Law Firm Integra-
tion, 46 Am. U. L. Rev. 669 (1997) (discussing race as well as gender integration).
75. See id. at 673-78.
76. See id. at 692-93; see also Commission on Women in the Profession, American
Bar Ass'n, Fair Measure: Toward Effective Attorney Evaluations 21-24 (1997) (rec-
ommending a process for "gender fair and effective evaluation[s]," including valuing
multiple styles of work, structuring evaluation instruments and interviews so both op-
erate more fairly, and including women in all phases and aspects of the evaluation
process).
77. See Chambliss, supra note 74, at 728-30.
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firms? Male managing partners? Bar associations? The market? In
short, the organizational analysis deployed by Chambliss bumps up
against the need for thoroughgoing structural change in the profession
and the absence of powerful groups with the will to accomplish this
change. Chambliss acknowledges that there is likely to be resistance
to such change, given the almost universal professional ideology (at
least in large law firms) that treats family responsibilities as suspect.7 s
Addressing the pros and cons of the "mommy-track" within law
firms, Rebecca Korzec brings another theoretical perspective to bear
on this problem-feminist literature about motherhood and the sex-
ual division of domestic labor.7 9 Korzec points out the substantial
benefits that men as a group gain from the fact that women perform
most of the caregiving labor in our society, concluding that women
who follow a "mommy-track" basically subsidize their spouses' ca-
reers while forestalling the transformative change that is necessary
both at home and in the workplace to enable women to succeed in law
firms.80 Her only substantive recommendations for change, however,
are to attack excessive hourly billing and suggest the adoption of gen-
der-neutral part-time work policies and alternate billing methods,
such as fixed fee and value billing.8 ' Again, one wonders who will
provide the impetus for these major changes in the operation of the
legal profession, a question that looms even larger given Korzec's de-
scription of the substantial benefits men derive from the current re-
ward structure and sexual division of labor. Even if accomplished,
moreover, there is reason to question whether the adoption by firms
of the new policies suggested will prove adequate to overcome the
substantial obstacles presented by the societal division of labor. Expe-
rience in other countries, for example, shows that "gender-neutral"
parenting leave is taken almost exclusively by women?' In addition,
competitive pressures suggest that law firms are unlikely to change
their ways of doing business on an individual or voluntary basis.
In analyzing the "feminization of the legal profession," Carrie
Menkel-Meadow brings to bear not only the tools of feminist analysis
but also substantial cross-historical, cross-cultural, and cross-discipli-
nary (law and medicine) research on the profession.' She concludes
78. See id. at 741.
79. See Rebecca Korzec, Working on the "Moininy-Track": Motherhood and Wo-
men Lawyers, 8 Hastings Women's L.J. 117 (1997).
80. See id. at 124-27.
81. See id. at 136-37.
82. See Jennifer Schirmer, Maternity Leave Policies: An International Survey:
Sweden, 11 Harv. Women's L.J. 185, 186 (1988) (reporting that very few men in Swe-
den took advantage of a gender-neutral and very generous parental leave policy).
83. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Exploring a Research Agenda of the Feminization
of the Legal Profession: Theories of Gender and Social Change, 14 L & Soc. Inquiry
289 (1989) [hereinafter Menkel-Meadow, Exploring a Research Agenda]; see also Car-
rie Menkel-Meadow, The Comparative Sociology of Women Lawyers: The "Ferniniza-
tion" of the Legal Profession, 24 Osgoode Hall L.J. 897 (1986).
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that for change to occur, it is necessary to explode the dominant para-
digms not only of the legal profession but also of research about it. It
is a mistake, she believes, to concentrate research and writing on large
law firms or to focus on the "mommy-track" and other work/family
issues.84 To do so accepts and thereby reinforces the dominant
(male) notions of success within the legal profession, the male para-
digm of professionalism as individualist and hierarchical, requiring
both professional "distance" and total commitment to work, and
traditional notions of the family and child-rearing." Preliminary re-
search on career satisfaction seems to show that women define success
"horizontally" rather than "vertically," finding fulfillment not from
traditional monetary rewards and status or prestige, but instead from
work that allows variety, balance, and larger meaning in their lives.8 6
Rather than studying sex segregation in large law firms and work/fam-
ily issues, therefore, Menkel-Meadow suggests that the more impor-
tant questions for research concern the nature and content of legal
work-how it is "defined, structured, and elaborated to reinforce and
encode particular conceptions of how that work should be con-
ducted."87 Moreover, she argues that innovation within the profession
is unlikely to occur within large law firms, the traditional centers of
power; instead researchers should study alternative work settings-
women-only firms and public interest and government jobs where wo-
men tend to cluster-to see whether the practice of law and legal cul-
ture are different in more heavily female institutions.8 8 In short,
Menkel-Meadow holds out little hope for the ultimate success of in-
cremental change within law firms as they are currently structured,
calling instead for major changes within the legal profession-changes
that will likely be explored first within alternative practice settings and
for which the political will is likely to come from "outsiders."
E. Attempts to Develop a Theory of Feminist Lawyering
Through Practice
As Menkel-Meadow had predicted, attempts to confront the limits
of formal equality have developed on the margins of the profession, as
women practitioners and academics have attempted to develop a vi-
sion of feminist lawyering that would transform the practice of law.
We discuss two aspects of this development: the establishment of wo-
men's law firms, and the theoretical work on feminist lawyering by
women teaching in law school clinics.
84. See Menkel-Meadow, Exploring a Research Agenda, supra note 83, at 307-08.
85. See id. at 307-10.
86. See id. at 307 (citing David Chambers's findings).
87. Id. at 304.
88. See id. at 317-18.
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1. Women's Law Firms
In a book originally published in 1981, Cynthia Fuchs Epstein de-
scribed the feminist law firms that were established in the 1970s.9 A
number of women's firms were established in New York City, in-
tending to serve women, democratize attorney-client relations, and es-
tablish egalitarian working communities. 0 Before the decade had
ended, however, these firms had all closed their doors, despite consid-
erable success in their legal work. The practices foundered for a vari-
ety of reasons, according to Epstein, many of them economic. The
feminist lawyers were ambivalent about making money, took many
clients who couldn't pay fees, and had trouble attracting fee-paying
business other than family law cases.91 The egalitarian structure of
their law offices led to stress and resentment among attorneys and
staff alike; moreover, women lawyers establishing the firms were all
young, creating a dilemma when they began to have children and
wanted to work part-time all at once.92 At the same time, the wo-
men's firms were exploring open, new, and non-authoritarian ways of
structuring the professional relationship. However, the firms' largely
female clients tended not only to expect more of their feminist law-
yers, but also to have unreasonable expectations (for example, that no
fees would be charged for lengthy "nurturing" conversations with
their attorneys), creating strains upon the attorney-client relation-
ship.93 By 1978, the feminist firms in New York had dissolved.
There appears to be a renaissance of women's (or majority wo-
men's) law firms in the 1990s.94 Like their predecessors, the women
pursuing this option typically form their own firms out of a desire to
pursue important social justice litigation (especially on matters of sig-
nificance to women), to implement a vision of legal practice that is
egalitarian, collaborative, and client-centered, and to obtain more
flexibility in combining work and personal life than is available in
large law firms.95 To accomplish this, some of these firms either split
all profits equally or explicitly detach rewards from billable hours, giv-
ing credit for administrative work, mentoring, and other important
tasks within the firm.9 6 Women lawyers who work in these firms re-
port a collegial attitude and comfortable environment as well as crea-
89. See Cynthia Fuchs Epstein, Women in Law 139-61 (2d ed. 1993).
90. See id. at 140.
91. See id. at 145-50.
92. See id. at 150-52.
93. See id. at 152-56.
94. See Deborah Graham, Law's New Entrepreneurs, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1995, at 54;
Hallye Jordan, Sacramento's Largest All-Women Firm Turns 10, Cal. L Bus., July 1,
1991, at 5; Abdon M. Pallasch, Women-Owned Firns Slow to Form But Many Predict
a Future Increase, Chi. Law., May 1995, at 4; Robert Safian, Breaking Barriers in Bos-
ton, Am. Law., May 1990, at 50.
95. See Graham, supra note 94, at 55.
96. See id. at 56.
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tive lawyering that often seeks less adversarial modes of conflict
resolution.97
Unlike the firms of the 1970s, however, the newer women's firms
appear to be prospering. This may have something to do with the age
of the participants in many of them: they tend to be older, past the
age of caring for very young children, and possess experience and con-
nections from practice in firms or government service. 98 Some earn
fees from types of cases that were not possible in the 1970s, such as
sexual harassment litigation; others have developed creative new fem-
inist causes of action out of claims learned from the lawyers' experi-
ence in corporate legal practice (for example, the successful RICO
claim against abortion clinic protesters).9 9 Others have attracted busi-
ness as a result of the new partners' previous prominence in govern-
ment service. 100 Government agencies and clients with diversity
commitments (or outright set-aside programs for contractors) have
also provided opportunities for women's firms. 10 While these newer
all-women firms represent only a small portion of the legal profession,
they provide important sources of innovation and potentially of more
general social change.
2. Feminist Legal Theory and Legal Clinics
A second source of innovation and of theoretical reflection on inno-
vative lawyering has been law school legal clinics, many of them
staffed by attorneys who left large law firms or other types of high-
volume practice for political or lifestyle reasons. As the clinical move-
ment grew, clinicians became well organized, both through the
Clinical Section of the Association of American Law Schools and a
separate Clinical Legal Education Association. Today, clinicians hold
multiple conferences each year. Prompted by pressure from their em-
ployers to produce scholarship as well as by a desire to share the
pedagogy emerging in clinical settings, clinical conferences began to
hold sessions on clinical scholarship and even founded a separate jour-
nal.1 2 By now, clinical scholarship has produced a large body of liter-
ature.' 3 Feminist legal theory has played an important role in this
97. See id.
98. See Jordan, supra note 94, at 5, 7; Pallasch, supra note 94.
99. See, e.g., Jordan, supra note 94, at 5 (describing Sacramento firm's success in
sex discrimination and sexual harassment cases); Pallasch, supra note 94 (describing
innovative use of RICO by majority women-owned firm in Chicago).
100. See Safian, supra note 94 (describing a Boston firm formed by ex-U.S.
Attorneys).
101. See Graham, supra note 94, at 56; Pallasch, supra note 94.
102. The Clinical Law Review: A Journal of Lawyering and Legal Education is co-
sponsored by the Clinical Legal Education Association, the Association of American
Law Schools, and New York University School of Law.
103. See generally, e.g., Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice:
Learning Lessons of Client Narrative, 100 Yale L.J. 2107 (1991) (discussing the notion
of poverty law advocacy as a medium of story telling); Clark D. Cunningham, A Tale
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scholarship throughout the 1990s, undoubtedly because so many clini-
cians are women."° Indeed, a sizable group of feminist legal scholars
has emerged from the ranks of clinicians or former clinicians-includ-
ing both authors of this article.
Some of the earliest scholarship about feminist lawyering focused
on whether to use feminist arguments and methods in the practice of
litigation, as was done, for example, in the "Voices Brief' filed in the
Webster abortion rights case.10 5 Other practitioner-academics argued
that the urgency of women's legal needs instead requires lawyers who
are trained and willing to fight with the weapons used in a legal system
currently organized around adversarial, win/lose principles."' 6 A simi-
lar controversy has concerned whether women attorneys should pre-
fer mediation and other modes of alternative dispute resolution that
embody an ethic of care, as suggested in Carrie Menkel-Meadow's
early work,0 7 in light of evidence that women and other dis-
empowered groups may be disadvantaged by informal processes. t 3
Other writers raise feminist concerns about the selection of clients.' °9
Are there particular types of cases that feminist attorneys should re-
fuse to take? Is it ethical (although a deviation from current profes-
sional standards) only to represent certain types of clients-or only
of Two Clients: Thinking About Law As Language, 87 Mich. L Rev. 2459 (1989)
(exploring the concept of representation through language, experience, knowledge,
and personal narrative); Jane M. Spinak, Reflections on a Case (of Motherhood), 95
Colum. L. Rev. 1990 (1995) (re-evaluating the author's own lawyering through the
"filter" of motherhood).
104. As of July 1998, there were 837 male clinicians and 616 female. See Electronic
mail from David Chavkin, Chair of the Data Collection and Dissemination Commit-
tees of the Association of American Law Schools and the Clinical Legal Education
Association, to Daniel Goldwin, Research Assistant for Cynthia Grant Bowman (July
23, 1998) (on file with Cynthia Grant Bowman). Thus, women make up about 42% of
clinical professors. By contrast, according to 1998 ABA statistics, women make up
only 27.6% of all full-time (tenure, tenure track, or long-term contract clinical) law
professors. See Official ABA Guide to Approved Law Schools 450 (Rick L Morgan
& Kurt Snyder eds., 1998).
105. See Ruth Colker, Feminist Litigation: An Oxymoron?-A Study of the Briefs
Filed in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 13 Harv. Women's U. 137, 170-72
(1990). The Voices Brief filed in Webster i. Reproductive Health Services, a major
abortion rights case before the Supreme Court, relied primarily upon first-hand ac-
counts of women's experiences with abortion decisions before and after Roe v Wade.
For excerpts from the Voices Brief, see Becker et al., supra note 3, at 391-94.
106. See Sarah E. Burns, Notes from the Field: A Repl' to Professor Colker, 13
Harv. Women's L.J. 189, 193 (1990) (arguing that feminist litigation must instead aim
at "transforming established social, economic, political and legal power relations that
work to the detriment of women," by whatever means necessary (citation omitted)).
107. See Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice, supra note 44.
108. See, e.g., Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women,
100 Yale U. 1545, 1600-01 (1991) (noting potential problems mediation poses to
women).
109. See, eg., Joan Mahoney, Using Gender as a Basis of Client Selection: A Femi-
nist Perspective, 20 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 79, 85-90 (1998) (analyzing under different
schools of feminist legal theory a Massachusetts case in which a female attorney re-
fused to represent a male divorce client).
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one gender? Still other articles attempt much more thoroughgoing
syntheses of the insights of feminist and clinical legal scholarship.'1"
The implications of feminist lawyering for the professional relation-
ship has played a central role in this discussion. Clinician Minna
Kotkin, for example, suggests that the values of care and connection
associated with women need not drive feminist lawyers out of litiga-
tion but instead can be incorporated, through an "advocacy of protec-
tion," into the professional relationship-one in which the attorney is
not distanced from the client and her goals, but acts empathetically
and assertively on her behalf."' Otherwise, Kotkin points out, care-
oriented attorneys might all leave the adversarial system and thereby
remove from it important sources of innovation.112
Perhaps the best and most helpful feminist scholarship to emerge
from clinical practice, however, is the analysis of actual clinical experi-
ence and insights gleaned from feminist legal scholarship. A good ex-
ample of this type of scholarship is Kimberly O'Leary's 1992 piece,
Creating Partnership: Using Feminist Techniques to Enhance the Attor-
ney-Client Relationship."3 In this work, O'Leary explicates three
techniques that have their origins in feminist scholarship: (1) asking
the "excluded person question" (that is, taking into account the exper-
iences and values of women and other persons who are "outsiders");
(2) consciousness raising; and (3) engaging in feminist practical rea-
soning (with more sensitivity to context)." 4 She then applies them to
actual cases that she and her students have confronted in a law school
clinic. For each, she describes a clinic case in which the discovery of
facts or development of a successful legal theory depended upon use
of these techniques. O'Leary also criticizes her own performance in a
case that was ultimately unsuccessful from the point of view of the
client (although litigated in an entirely ethical, professional, and tech-
nically correct manner from the point of view of traditional legal
rules), demonstrating how the use of feminist techniques would not
only have led to more satisfactory results but would also have consti-
tuted better lawyering. For example, had O'Leary understood the im-
portance of the Native American and migrant farm cultures in which
one client lived, the two might have formed a genuine partnership
around shared values and goals. 115 Such a partnership would also
110. See generally, e.g., Goldfarb, supra note 2 (exploring methodological relation-
ship between clinical legal education and feminist jurisprudence).
111. Minna J. Kotkin, Professionalism, Gender and the Public Interest: The Advo-
cacy of Protection, 8 St. Thomas L. Rev. 157, 169-73 (1995).
112. See id. at 171-72.
113. 16 Legal Stud. F. 207 (1992).
114. Id. at 212. These techniques were described originally in Katharine T. Bart-
lett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 829 (1990).
115. See O'Leary, supra note 113, at 207-09, 221-22. The client wanted custody or
visitation with a child she had not seen for more than four years, but only succeeded
in preventing the child's adoption by the father's wife and obtaining brief supervised
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have enabled O'Leary to counsel her client more realistically that
those goals could not ultimately be fulfilled by the legal system." 6
O'Leary's article reflects an amalgam of theory and practice-start-
ing from frustrations that arose out of practice, applying feminist the-
ory, reflecting upon the results, and then drawing conclusions about
the attorney-client relationship, the appropriate professional distance,
the relevance of extrinsic facts, and what constitutes good lawyering.
The clinical setting constitutes a forum in which O'Leary can both dis-
cuss and model innovative lawyering to her students. In this sense,
law school clinics are perhaps the ideal setting for developing trans-
formative innovations in the legal profession, because they encourage
reflective lawyering as a pedagogical tool and provide laboratories in
which to experiment with more effective lawyering. They are also a
setting in which the next generation of lawyers is trained.
CONCLUSION
As we have shown, the interrelationship between feminist legal the-
ory and legal practice is complex and striking. The interaction ap-
pears in the very genealogy of feminist legal theory, as practitioners
grappled with women's legal problems and sought new substantive
legal solutions for them. In this crucible, feminist legal theory was
born and developed into the variety of more nuanced theories that
exist today. Similarly, an active dialogue arose among feminist practi-
tioners and theorists about the nature of the legal profession because
they were confronted with the problems women encountered in the
practice of law. This dialogue led to a flowering of theory when the
formal equality approach that brought down the initial barriers to en-
try into the profession proved inadequate to address the continuing
obstacles women lawyers faced, both informal and structural. Theo-
ries of feminist lawyering developed, largely out of cultural feminist
approaches, and a critique of legal practice, heavily influenced by
dominance feminism's challenge to the rules and structures taken as
definitional of the profession. At the same time, feminist practitioners
accumulated evidence about problems, lobbied for changes, and ex-
perimented with different ways in which to structure their own prac-
tice of law. In short, the interrelationship between theory and practice
has generated and enriched feminist legal theory, resulted in innova-
tive feminist lawmaking efforts, and produced important critiques of
the legal profession.
visitation that did not prove very successful; ultimately, O'Leary withdrew as her at-
torney. See idU at 207-09.
116. See iL
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